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JUDGE GORSUCH AND JOHNSON RESENTENCING 
(THIS IS NOT A JOKE) 
Leah M. Litman* 
Jan Crawford has reported that President Donald Trump is strongly 
considering appointing Judge Neil Gorsuch of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit to the U.S. Supreme Court.1 I do not know 
Judge Gorsuch, but I do know his opinion in Prost v. Anderson, which is a 
rather wonky case on a somewhat technical area of federal habeas law.2 Prost 
provides an interesting insight into Judge Gorsuch’s jurisprudence. The case 
concerns an issue on which the courts of appeals disagree, so it provides a 
nice glimpse into how Judge Gorsuch might address matters that are 
reasonably susceptible to different resolution, as many of the Supreme 
Court’s cases are. Prost illustrates how Judge Gorsuch will balance 
competing considerations of fairness and administrability in criminal law. 
While there is much to like about Prost—it is well written, clearly reasoned, 
and adopts an administrable rule—the opinion also raises some concerns. 
The opinion overvalues proceduralism relative to substantive rights in a way 
that will have the effect of eroding litigants’ access to courts. 
I. THE ISSUE 
Prost v. Anderson addressed when section 2255(e) allows a federal 
prisoner to file a petition for federal habeas corpus under the general habeas 
corpus statute, section 2241, instead of filing a motion for relief under 
section 2255.3 Section 2255 is the congressionally created post-conviction 
remedy for federal prisoners—that is, how federal prisoners challenge their 
convictions and sentences after their conviction has become final.4 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law. Thanks to 
Daniel Deacon and Rakesh Kilaru for helpful comments and conversations. 
 1. Jonathan H. Adler, Justice Gorsuch?, NATIONAL REVIEW (Jan. 22, 2017, 1:20 PM), 
http://c9.nrostatic.com/bench-memos/444102/justice-gorsuch [https://perma.cc/88A8-67L2]. 
 2. 636 F.3d 578 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 3. Prost, 636 F.3d at 584. 
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012). Prisoners’ convictions become final when the Supreme 
Court denies their petition for certiorari from their appeal in the court of appeals, or when the 
time to file their petition for certiorari expires. Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011). 
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Why would federal prisoners want to file petitions for habeas corpus 
under section 2241 rather than file motions under section 2255? The reason 
is that Congress imposed a litany of draconian conditions on prisoners’ 
ability to challenge their convictions under section 2255.5 For example, 
prisoners generally have one year from the time their conviction becomes 
final to file a motion under section 2255.6 The restrictions on successive 
motions under section 2255 are especially severe.7 If a prisoner has already 
filed one post-conviction motion, she may file another only in two 
circumstances—one, if newly discovered evidence “establishe[s] by clear and 
convincing evidence” that the defendant is not “guilty of the offense,” and 
 
 5. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2255; id. § 2244. 
 6. Id. § 2255(f). 
 7. Prisoners must obtain permission from a panel of the court of appeals that the 
would-be successive motion satisfies these requirements. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A)–(B) 
(2012); id. § 2255(h). Section 2255 (like section 2244(b)) requires a prisoner, before filing a 
second or successive application, to obtain a ruling from a panel of the court of appeals that the 
conditions have been satisfied. Id. § 2255(h). It does not, however, explicitly say that the court 
of appeals’ decision to grant or deny authorization to file a successive motion cannot be 
appealed by way of a petition for rehearing or for certiorari. Id.; see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., 
ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1360 n.7 
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 7th ed. 2015). Contra § 2244(b)(3)(E). But courts have either held 
or operated on the understanding that section 2255’s prefatory clause incorporates section 
2244(b)(3)(E)’s prohibition on petitions for certiorari or rehearing. See, e.g., In re Clark, 837 
F.3d 1080, 1082 (10th Cir. 2016); In re McCall, 826 F.3d 1308, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(Martin, J., concurring) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E)) (“Most troubling, these orders 
‘shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of 
certiorari.’ Of course, when we grant an application, the prisoner can file his motion, and it will 
then be subject to adversarial presentation and the normal appeal process. But when we deny 
an application, that prisoner gets no further consideration of his sentence.”); In re Fleur, 824 
F.3d 1337, 1344 (11th Cir. 2016) (Martin, J., concurring) (same); Págan-San Miguel v. United 
States, 736 F.3d 44, 46 n.1 (1st Cir. 2013); In re Graham, 714 F.3d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E)) (citing Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); Missouri v. 
Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012)) (denying authorization based on Frye and Lafler and stating, 
“This denial of authorization ‘shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition 
for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.’ ”); United States v. Wyatt, 672 F.3d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 
2012) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E)) (“Our denial of leave to file a second or successive 
section 2255 is not appealable and the district courts lack jurisdiction to consider a section 
2255 motion by Wyatt. Therefore, Wyatt will get nowhere filing a section 2255 motion or an 
application under section 2244(b) in the Seventh Circuit.”); Paulino v. United States, 352 F.3d 
1056, 1058 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Villa-Gonzalez, 208 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 
2000); Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 367 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[W]e now hold that § 
2244(b)(3)(D) and § 2244(b)(3)(E) apply to § 2255.”). 
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two, if she raises a claim that that “relies on a new rule of constitutional law, 
made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.”8 
The latter restriction is especially difficult for prisoners to meet after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Tyler v. Cain.9 In Tyler, the Court held that a 
rule has been made retroactive only if the Court has held the rule to be 
retroactive.10 Thus, a prisoner can establish that a rule has been “made 
retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court” by showing that “the Supreme Court 
h[eld] [the rule] . . . to be retroactive”11—either by applying that rule to a 
case on collateral review, or by issuing a series of decisions whose holdings 
make that rule retroactive.12 As a result, courts sometimes conclude that, 
even though a new rule is retroactive, a prisoner cannot rely on that rule to 
bring a successive motion under section 2255 because the Supreme Court 
has not yet made that rule retroactive.13 
The restrictions on successive section 2255 motions prevent prisoners 
from being able to challenge convictions and sentences that everyone agrees 
are unlawful. A prisoner can have a winning claim, but if that claim has not 
been made retroactive by the Supreme Court, section 2255 does not provide 
the prisoner with a remedy.14 For example, in Johnson v. United States, the 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Armed Career Criminal Act’s 
(ACCA) residual clause.15 ACCA subjected defendants who were convicted 
of being felons in possession of a firearm to a mandatory minimum term of 
fifteen years’ imprisonment.16 Without ACCA, these defendants were only 
eligible for up to ten years’ imprisonment.17 Johnson, therefore, meant that 
some defendants were sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment when the 
statute under which they were convicted said they could be sentenced to no 
more than ten years.18 Before April 2016, the Supreme Court had never 
applied Johnson to a case on collateral review (i.e., to a case that had become 
 
 8. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). The requirements for federal prisoners are slightly different 
in that federal prisoners do not need to establish the newly discovered evidence could not have 
been obtained through diligence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1). 
 9. 533 U.S. 656 (2001). 
 10. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 666. 
 11. Id. at 663–64; Leah M. Litman, Resentencing in the Shadow of Johnson v. United 
States, 28 FED. SENT’G REP. 45, 48–49 (2015). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See infra note 20 (describing courts’ treatment of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 
2551 (2015) claims). 
 14. Id. 
 15. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
 16. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2555–56. 
 17. Id. at 2574. 
 18. Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016). 
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final).19 Some courts, therefore, held that prisoners who had already filed one 
motion under section 2255 could not file a successive motion under section 
2255, even though these prisoners’ sentences were at least five years longer 
than they could lawfully be.20 
Section 2241 does not contain any of the same limitations on 
challenging a conviction or sentence.21 Hence, prisoners who are barred 
from challenging their conviction or sentence under section 2255 because of 
its restrictions may try to challenge their convictions or sentences under 
section 2241.22 
Congress explicitly allowed some prisoners to do just that in section 
2255. Section 2255(e) provides: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is 
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not 
be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, 
by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied 
him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or 
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.23 
Section 2255(e) thus allows prisoners to challenge their convictions or 
sentences under section 2241 when the remedy provided by section 2255 is 
“inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [their] detention[s].”24 
What this language means was the question presented in Prost.25 That is, 
when is section 2255 “inadequate or ineffective,” and when can prisoners 
challenge their convictions or sentences under section 2241 if they cannot do 
so under section 2255?26 
That question is hard. On the one hand, section 2255(e) cannot mean 
that every prisoner who is not allowed to challenge her conviction or 
sentence under section 2255 can do so under section 2241. Otherwise, all of 
the restrictions on section 2255 would be superfluous. On the other hand, 
Congress said that there would be some cases in which prisoners precluded 
from challenging their convictions or sentences under section 2255 could 
 
 19. See id. at 1257. 
 20. See, e.g., In re Williams, 806 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding Johnson had not been 
made retroactive by the Supreme Court); In re Gieswein, 802 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2015); In re 
Rivero, 797 F.3d 986 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 21. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012). 
 22. Id.; id. § 2255. 
 23. Id. § 2255(e). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 26. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). 
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challenge their convictions or sentences under section 2241.27 Determining 
which prisoners can resort to section 2241 is tricky. “Inadequate” and 
“ineffective” are open-ended terms, and there is no legislative history to 
suggest what these terms might mean.28 
Unsurprisingly, the courts of appeals have come up with different 
interpretations of the scope of section 2255(e). The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit has held that section 2255(e) allows prisoners to file 
motions under section 2241 when a subsequent decision has changed the 
relevant substantive criminal law.29 That would occur when a court has 
interpreted the statute under which the defendant was convicted such that 
the defendant did not actually commit an act that the law made criminal. For 
example, say a defendant was convicted for “using a firearm,” and the court 
later holds that “using a firearm” means firing it. If the defendant was 
convicted because he juggled the firearm, he would have been convicted for 
an act that the law did not actually make criminal. That defendant could not 
apply for relief under section 2255, because his claim relies on a decision of 
statutory interpretation, rather than a constitutional rule.30 But the Fourth 
Circuit would allow him to challenge his conviction under section 2241.31 
The Seventh Circuit similarly allows defendants to challenge their sentences 
under section 2241 when a subsequent decision of statutory interpretation 
means that the defendant was wrongfully subject to a higher, mandatory 
sentence.32 Prisoners who were wrongfully sentenced under ACCA could 
challenge their sentences under section 2241 because they would have been 
sentenced to at least fifteen years when the statute, properly interpreted, 
sentenced them to at most ten years. And the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits 
allow defendants to resort to section 2241 under similar circumstances, 
although they frame the test in somewhat different terms—prisoners can use 
section 2241 when they rely on a new, substantive claim that was previously 
foreclosed by circuit precedent.33 Finally, the Second Circuit has suggested 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. E.g., Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e have found 
nothing in the legislative history explaining why the relevant language was changed or what the 
new language means.”); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Again, there is no 
helpful legislative history.”). 
 29. In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333–34 (4th Cir. 2000). The Third Circuit’s test resembles 
this as well. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 30. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012). 
 31. In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 333–34. 
 32. Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 33. See Bryant v. Warden, 738 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2013); Reyes-Requena v. 
United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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that section 2241 is available when the absence of a section 2255 remedy 
would raise serious constitutional questions.34 
II. JUDGE GORSUCH’S TAKE 
Judge Gorsuch’s opinion in Prost rejected all of these approaches.35 Prost 
held that section 2255(e) allows prisoners to challenge their convictions or 
sentences under section 2241 only if the prisoner’s detention could not “have 
been tested in an initial § 2255 motion.”36 What does this mean? It means 
that section 2241 is available only when a prisoner literally could not get to 
court to file an initial section 2255 motion, such as where “the defendant’s 
sentencing court had been abolished” when the prisoner sought to file the 
initial section 2255 motion.37 Judge Gorsuch’s approach would not allow any 
of the previously mentioned prisoners to challenge their convictions or 
sentences under section 2241—prisoners who were convicted of acts the law 
did not make criminal; prisoners who were sentenced above the statutory 
maximum for their offense; or prisoners whose convictions or sentences 
violated some substantive rule of constitutional law.38 Ooph. 
Judge Gorsuch gave several reasons for interpreting section 2255(e) this 
way. One, the statute’s text described the prisoner’s “remedy,” which Judge 
Gorsuch thought referred to the processnot substanceof section 2255 
proceedings, and included only the “opportunity to bring [an] argument,” 
rather than to win it.39 Two, when Congress enacted section 2255, “it was 
surely aware that prisoners might seek to pursue second or successive 
motions based on newly issued statutory interpretation decisions,” but 
 
 34. Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 380 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 35. Another of President Trump’s potential nominees, Judge William Pryor of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, has argued for an interpretation of section 2255(e) 
similar to Judge Gorsuch’s. See Samak v. Warden, 766 F.3d 1271, 1295 (11th Cir. 2014) (Pryor, 
J., concurring) (noting that the only other circuit court to consider the ordinary meaning of 
section 2255 was the Tenth Circuit in the Prost case). The Eleventh Circuit is currently 
considering, en banc, whether to adopt Judge Pryor’s interpretation. See Memorandum to 
Counsel or Parties at 1, McCarthan v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, No. 12-14989 (11th 
Cir. June 6, 2016); Docket, McCarthan, No. 12-14989 (11th Cir. Jan. 28, 2017). 
 36. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584, 588 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 37. Id. at 588. 
 38. See id. at 588–94. Prost maintained that it was reserving for another day whether 
section 2255(e) allowed prisoners to resort to section 2241 where necessary to avoid a serious 
constitutional concern. But the tenor of the opinion, combined with the court’s 
characterizations of the scope of the Suspension Clause, does not suggest the court was 
inclined to expand the availability of section 2241 much beyond what Prost had done. Id. at 
583 n.4. 
 39. Id. at 584. 
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Congress did not allow those kinds of claims to be raised in successive 
motions.40 Three, several surrounding provisions emphasize “providing a 
single opportunity to test arguments, rather than any guarantee of relief or 
results.”41 Four, section 2255 was enacted to allow federal prisoners to 
challenge their convictions and sentences in the district where they were 
sentenced, rather than only in the district where they were incarcerated.42 It 
was not “adopted to expand or ‘impinge upon prisoners’ rights of collateral 
attack upon their convictions,’ but only to address the ‘difficulties that had 
arisen in administering’ habeas corpus.”43 
I’ll start with what I like about the opinion—it’s a fun read. I also think 
Judge Gorsuch is right to think that Congress had to know, in some general 
sense, that prisoners would try to challenge their convictions by asserting 
new constitutional rules or new decisions of statutory interpretation in 
successive motions.44 And the successive motions that Congress authorized 
do not include those kinds of claims.45 So, the argument goes, Congress 
could not have meant to allow these prisoners to challenge their convictions 
or sentences via section 2241.46 
Judge Gorsuch’s interpretation of section 2255(e) also avoids “plenty of 
knotty . . . legal questions about” how to apply the other circuits’ more open-
ended standards for when prisoners can resort to section 2241.47 Some 
circuits permit prisoners to challenge their convictions under section 2241 
based on a new decision of statutory interpretation because Congress made 
no allowance for statutory claims in the provision authorizing successive 
motions under section 2255.48 But does that mean Congress “forgot” about 
statutory claims, or that it did not want to authorize statutory claims at all? 
That same question comes up in any case where a prisoner is not permitted 
to file a successive motion under section 2255.49 Did Congress merely forget 
about those prisoners, or did Congress intend to foreclose those prisoners’ 
ability to rely on section 2241? Judge Gorsuch’s was-there-an-actual-court-
to-hear-your-initial-section-2255-claim rule is a lot more administrable than 
 
 40. Id. at 585. 
 41. Id. at 587. 
 42. Id. at 587–88. 
 43. Id. at 587–88 (quoting United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952)). 
 44. Id. at 585. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 586. 
 47. Id. at 596. 
 48. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 49. See, e.g., Bryant v. Warden, 738 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2013); Reyes-Requena v. 
United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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approaches that differentiate between different kinds of claims, and that is a 
big mark in its favor.50 
My concern, however, is that a lot of tests would be administrable. It 
would be pretty easy to administer an interpretation of section 2255 that said 
defendants who filed Mondays through Thursdays couldn’t resort to section 
2241; it would also be pretty easy to administer a test that said no one could. 
But no one thinks that’s what section 2255(e) means, and Judge Gorsuch’s 
opinion does not expend a lot of effort to address some of what (I think) 
makes interpreting section 2255(e) a harder question than the opinion 
suggests, or to try and come up with an administrable rule that isn’t quite 
so . . . draconian. 
Start with the text: Judge Gorsuch’s opinion says that section 2255(e) 
means a prisoner can resort to section 2241 when the sentencing court 
literally isn’t there to hear a prisoner’s initial section 2255 motion.51 The 
problem is that section 2255(e) specifies that section 2255 may be inadequate 
or ineffective even where the sentencing court does hear a prisoner’s initial 
section 2255 motion and rejects it.52 The provision refers to when “the court 
which sentenced [the prisoner] . . . denied him relief”—in other words, 
where the sentencing court actually heard the prisoner’s initial section 2255 
motion.53 I’m not sure those words mean his analysis is wrong, but it would 
have been nice if his opinion acknowledged them. 
Judge Gorsuch maintained that section 2255(e)’s reference to the 
“remedy” referred to the process of challenging the prisoner’s conviction, 
not the outcome of that process.54 But the Court has used “remedy” to refer 
to the result a plaintiff obtained by filing suit, not just the process applicable 
to different kinds of lawsuits.55 And as a verb, “remedy” means to set 
something right; as a noun, it can mean the fix for that something (e.g., the 
result).56 
I’m also not that convinced by the more purposivist moves that Judge 
Gorsuch’s opinion made, many of which sound in the idea that the relevant 
 
 50. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 588 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 51. Id. 
 52. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Prost, 636 F.3d at 589. 
 55. E.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20–21 (1980) (“Because the Bivens remedy is 
recoverable against individuals, it is a more effective deterrent than the FTCA remedy against 
the United States.”); N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971) (“The prohibition 
is absolute, and it would inescapably operate to obstruct the remedies granted by the District 
Court in the Swann case.”). 
 56. Remedy, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/ 
definition/remedy [https://perma.cc/BMS4-5L48]. 
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statute generally restricts prisoners’ ability to file successive motions. He’s 
right that, in light of the restrictions on successive motions, “[f]ederal 
prisoners seeking to take advantage of new rulings of constitutional 
magnitude that would render their convictions null and void are not always 
allowed to do so.”57 But so what? That just means they cannot all be allowed 
to challenge their convictions or sentences under section 2241; it does not 
mean that some of them can’t be permitted to. The restrictions on federal 
courts’ review of state criminal convictions are not especially relevant 
because they embody concerns about federal review of state judgments.58 
And the provision that says the ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel 
shall not serve as a ground for relief, section 2254(i), likewise is limited to 
section 2254, which governs state prisoners, rather than section 2255, which 
governs federal prisoners.59 In any case, the Supreme Court has held that the 
provision bars federal courts from relying on post-conviction counsel’s 
performance as a basis to overturn the prisoner’s conviction; it does not bar 
federal courts from relying on counsel’s performance as a bypass to 
procedural restrictions on post-conviction review, including statutory 
ones.60 Prisoners seeking to rely on section 2255(e) are trying to do just 
that—get around procedural restrictions using post-conviction counsel’s 
performance. 
It’s also not clear that section 2255’s restrictions on successive motions 
are evidence that section 2255(e) was not intended to provide a safe harbor 
for prisoners who are barred by the restrictions on successive motions. The 
restrictions on successive motions, codified at section 2255(h),61 were 
enacted several decades after section 2255(e)62; they therefore do not say 
much about the scope of section 2255(e).63 Even if Congress had in mind 
certain difficulties with habeas when it enacted section 2255(e), it used much 
broader language than something that might limit the provision to prisoners 
who had difficulty “comply[ing] with § 2255’s new venue mandate.”64 And 
there’s a decent argument that the savings clause could function as a 
 
 57. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 587 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 58. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). 
 59. Id. § 2254(i); id. § 2255. 
 60. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012) (holding post-conviction counsel’s 
performance may excuse a procedural default); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 650–51 (2010) 
(holding post-conviction counsel’s performance may toll the statute of limitations). 
 61. See 110 Stat. 1220 (1948). 
 62. See Pub. L. No. 104-32, § 105, 62 Stat. 967, 968 (1996). 
 63. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 645 (2010) (“When a later statute is offered as an 
expression of how the Congress interpreted a statute passed by another Congress a half century 
before, such interpretation has very little, if any, significance.” (quoting Rainwater v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 590, 593 (1958)) (internal quotation marks and punctuation omitted)). 
 64. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 588 (10th Cir. 2011). 
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backstop in the event that section 2255’s restrictions on successive motions 
are declared invalid.65 
Prost might just be limited to Prost. But, for me, it raises some broader 
concerns. The statutes governing post-conviction review are notoriously 
unclear and shoddily drafted, and they accordingly raise a lot of difficult 
interpretive questions.66 I’m wary of any approach that gets fed up with these 
difficulties and relies instead on the intuition that the statutes were intended 
to restrict, rather than expand, post-conviction review. Even if that general 
claim is right, it does not follow that every interpretive uncertainty should be 
resolved against habeas petitioners, especially when the consequences are so 
severe, as they were in Prost. 
Judge Gorsuch’s concern about the limiting principle, or 
administrability of the other courts of appeals’ interpretations of section 
2255(e), also rings a bit hollow to me. Many issues that the Supreme Court 
addresses raise difficult questions about what limiting principle there is to 
the Court’s doctrine—including what rights not specifically enumerated in 
the text of the Constitution are enforceable in court or what limits there are 
on Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. The answer cannot be 
that all interpretations or doctrines that raise administrability concerns are 
necessarily suspect. Judge Gorsuch certainly does not believe this. In some of 
his recent writings, Judge Gorsuch has indicated that he is willing to revisit 
longstanding doctrines about judicial deference to administrative agencies 
based on constitutional principles like the separation of powers, which are 
amorphous and vague, and thus difficult to administer in a principled way.67 
If legal uncertainty is not a reason for judges to hold back in the separation 
of powers domain, why is it a reason to do so in criminal law, where so much 
is at stake? 
Finally, it’s worth noting what claim the petitioner in Prost was trying to 
raise. The petitioner in Prost was arguing that his money-laundering 
conviction was invalid in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Santos v. 
United States, which narrowly interpreted the federal money-laundering 
statute.68 The plurality opinion in Santos was written by Justice Scalia, the 
Justice that Judge Gorsuch would replace. Justice Scalia used Santos to 
 
 65. See Litman, supra note 11, at 52–53 (arguing for availability of savings clause where 
petitioners sentenced above statutory maximum); Leah M. Litman, Legal Innocence and 
Federal Habeas (Jan. 26, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 66. See, e.g., Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. 
L. REV. 443 (2007). 
 67. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
 68. See Santos v. United States, 553 U.S. 507 (2008). 
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reaffirm his view that ambiguities in criminal statutes should be resolved in 
favor the defendant.69 That rule of interpretation applies only to substantive 
criminal statutes that define offenses and sentences, not remedial statutes 
that say when a conviction can be challenged. But Prost still makes one 
wonder about what a Justice Gorsuch would mean for criminal justice at the 
Supreme Court. Many of the Court’s opinions that rule in favor of 
government officials on criminal justice issues do so by narrowing what 
remedies are available to raise criminal procedure claims, which is exactly 
what Judge Gorsuch did in Prost. And if the Court continues to chip away at 
these remedies, the underlying rights will start disappearing too.70 
 
 
 69. Id. at 514. Another example is Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), 
which invalidated a statute as unconstitutionally vague. Johnson is one of my favorite decisions. 
See, e.g., Leah M. Litman, Residual Impact: Resentencing Implications of Johnson’s Potential 
Ruling on ACCA’s Constitutionality, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 55 (2015). 
 70. E.g., Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified 
Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Enforcement of Constitutional Rights 
and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219 (2015). It’s possible, 
of course, that this would be a concern with all of President Trump’s potential nominees. See, 
e.g., supra note 35. Judge Sykes, however, joined the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Brown v. 
Caraway, 719 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2013). 
